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Learning Nash Equilibria in Monotone Games
Tatiana Tatarenko and Maryam Kamgarpour, IEEE Member
Abstract—We consider multi-agent decision making where
each agent’s cost function depends on all agents’ strategies. We
propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium,
whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function
at each joint played action, lacking any information of the
functional form of her cost or other agents’ costs or strategy sets.
In contrast to past work where convergent algorithms required
strong monotonicity, we prove algorithm convergence under mere
monotonicity assumption. This significantly widens algorithm’s
applicability, such as to games with linear coupling constraints.
Index Terms—learning in games, distributed algorithms
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a powerful framework for analyzing and
optimizing multi-agent decision making problems. In several
such problems, each agent (referred to also as a player) does
not have full information on her objective function, due to the
unknown interactions and other players’ strategies affecting
her objective. Consider for example, a transportation network
in which an agent’s objective is minimizing travel time or an
electricity network in which an agent’s objective is minimizing
own’s electricity prices. In these instances, the travel times
and prices, respectively, depend non-trivially on the strategies
of other agents. Motivated by this limited information setup,
we consider computing Nash equilibria given only the so-
called payoff-based information. That is, each player can only
observe the values of its objective function at a joint played
action, does not know the functional form of her or others’
objectives, nor the strategy sets and actions of other players,
and cannot communicate with other players. In this setting, we
address the question of how agents should update their actions
to converge to a Nash equilibrium strategy.
A large body of literature on learning Nash equilibria
with payoff-based information has focused on finite action
setting or potential games, see for example, [11, 12, 7] and
references therein. For games with continuous (uncountable)
action spaces, a payoff-based approach was developed based
on the extremum seeking idea in optimization [3, 13], and
assuming strongly convex objectives almost sure convergence
to the Nash equilibrium was proven. A payoff-based approach,
inspired by the logit dynamics in finite action games [2] was
extended to continuous action setting for the case of potential
games [14]. The work in [16] considered learning Nash
equilibria in continuous action games on networks. Crucially,
the work additionally assumed that each player exchanges
information with her neighbors, to facilitate estimation of the
gradient of her objective function online.
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Recently, we proposed a payoff-based approach to learn
Nash equilibria in a class of convex games [15]. Our approach
hinged upon connecting Nash equilibria of a game to the
solution set of a related variational inequality problem. Our
algorithm convergence was established for the cases in which
the game mapping is strongly monotone or the game admits
a potential function. Apart from possibly limited scope of a
potential game, strong monotonicity can be too much to ask
for. In particular, if the objective function of an agent is linear
in her action or in the presence of coupling constraints of the
action sets the game mapping will not be strongly monotone.
Our goal here is to extend the existing payoff-based learning
approaches to a broader class of games characterized by mono-
tone game mappings. While algorithms for solving monotone
variational inequalities exist (see, for example, Chapter 12
in [9]), these algorithms either consist of two timescales
(Tikhonov regularization approach) or have an extra gradient
step (extra-gradient methods). As such, they require more
coordination between players than that possible in a payoff-
based only information structure.
Our contributions are as follows. First, we propose a dis-
tributed payoff-based algorithm to learn Nash equilibria in a
monotone game, extending our past work [15] applicable to
strongly monotone games, inspired by the single timescale
algorithm for solving stochastic variational inequalities [6].
Second, despite lack of gradients in a payoff-based informa-
tion, contrary to the setup in [6], we show that our proposed
procedure can be interpreted as a stochastic gradient descent
with an additional biasL and regularization terms. Third, we
prove convergence of the proposed algorithm to Nash equi-
libria by suitably bounding the bias and noise variance terms
using established results on boundedness and convergence of
discrete-time Markov processes.
Notations. The set {1, . . . , N} is denoted by [N ]. Bold-
face is used to distinguish between vectors in a multi-
dimensional space and scalars. Given N vectors xi ∈ Rd,
i ∈ [N ], (xi)Ni=1 := (x1⊤, . . . ,xN
⊤
)⊤ ∈ RNd; x−i :=
(x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xN ) ∈ R(N−1)d. Rd+ and Z+ denote
respectively, vectors from Rd with non-negative coordinates
and non-negative whole numbers. The standard inner product
on Rd is denoted by (·, ·): Rd×Rd → R, with associated norm
‖x‖ :=
√
(x,x). Given some matrix A ∈ Rd×d, A  (≻)0,
if and only if x⊤Ax ≥ (>)0 for all x 6= 0. We use the big-O
notation, that is, the function f(x) : R → R is O(g(x)) as
x→ a, f(x) = O(g(x)) as x → a, if limx→a |f(x)||g(x)| ≤ K for
some positive constant K . We say that a function f(x) grows
not faster than a function g(x) as x → ∞, if there exists a
positive constant Q such that f(x) ≤ g(x) ∀x with ‖x‖ ≥ Q.
Definition 1: A mapping M : Rd → Rd is monotone over
X ⊆ Rd, if (M (x)−M(y),x−y) ≥ 0 for every x,y ∈ X .
2II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a game Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}) with N players, the sets
of players’ actions Ai ⊆ Rd, i ∈ [N ], and the cost (objective)
functions Ji : A→ R, where A = A1× . . .×AN denotes the
set of joint actions. We restrict the class of games as follows.
Assumption 1: The game under consideration is convex.
Namely, for all i ∈ [N ] the set Ai is convex and closed,
the cost function Ji(a
i,a−i) is defined on RNd, continuously
differentiable in a and convex in ai for fixed a−i.
Assumption 2: The mapping M : RNd → RNd, referred to
as the game mapping, defined by
M(a) = (∇aiJi(ai,a−i))Ni=1 = (M1(a), . . . ,MN (a))⊤,
where M i(a) = (Mi,1(a), . . . ,Mi,d(a))
⊤, and
Mi,k(a) =
∂Ji(a)
∂aik
, a ∈ A, i ∈ [N ], k ∈ [d], (1)
is monotone on A (see Definition 1).
We consider a Nash equilibrium in game Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji})
as a stable solution outcome because it represents a joint action
from which no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate.
Definition 2: A point a∗ ∈ A is called a Nash equilibrium
if for any i ∈ [N ] and ai ∈ Ai
Ji(a
i∗,a−i∗) ≤ Ji(ai,a−i∗).
Our goal is to learn such a stable action in a game through
designing a payoff-based algorithm. We first connect existence
of Nash equilibria for Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}) with solution set of a
corresponding variational inequality problem.
Definition 3: Consider a mapping T (·): Rd → Rd and a set
Y ⊆ Rd. A solution SOL(Y,T ) to the variational inequality
problem V I(Y,T ) is a set of vectors y∗ ∈ Y such that
(T (y∗),y − y∗) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Y .
Theorem 1: (Proposition 1.4.2 in [9]) Given a game
Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}) with game mapping M , suppose that the
action sets {Ai} are closed and convex, the cost functions {Ji}
are continuously differentiable in a and convex in ai for every
fixed a−i on the interior of A. Then, some vector a∗ ∈ A is
a Nash equilibrium in Γ, if and only if a∗ ∈ SOL(A,M).
It follows that under Assumptions 1 and 2 for a game with
mappingM , any solution of V I(A,M ) is also a Nash equi-
librium in such games and vice versa. While Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji})
under Assumptions 1 and 2 might admit a Nash equilibrium,
these two assumptions alone do not guarantee existence of
a Nash equilibrium. To guarantee existence, one needs to
consider a more restrictive assumption, for example, strong
monotonicity of the game mapping or compactness of the
action sets [9]. Here, we do not restrict our attention to such
cases. However, to have a meaning discussion, we do assume
existence of at least one Nash equilibrium in the game.
Assumption 3: The set SOL(A,M) is not empty.
Corollary 1: Let Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}) be a game with game
mapping M for which Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then,
there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in Γ. Moreover, any
Nash equilibrium in Γ belongs to the set SOL(A,M).
The following additional assumptions are needed for con-
vergence of the proposed payoff-based algorithm to a Nash
equilibrium (see proofs of Lemma 3 and Theorem 2).
Assumption 4: Each element M i of the game mapping
M : RNd → RNd, defined in Assumption (2) is Lipschitz
continuous on Rd with a Lipschitz constant Li.
Assumption 5: Each cost function Ji(a), i ∈ [N ], grows not
faster than a linear function of a as ‖a‖ → ∞.
III. PAYOFF-BASED ALGORITHM
Given a payoff-based information, each agent has access
to its current action, referred to as its state and denoted by
xi(t) = (xi1, . . . , x
i
d)
⊤ ∈ Rd, and the cost value Jˆi(t) at the
joint states x(t) = (x1(t), . . . ,xN (t)), Jˆi(t) = Ji(x(t)) =
Ji(x
1(t), . . . ,xN (t)) at iteration t. Using this information in
the proposed algorithm each agent i “mixes” its next state
xi(t + 1). Namely, it chooses xi(t + 1) randomly according
to the multidimensional normal distribution N(µi(t + 1) =
(µi1(t+ 1), . . . , µ
i
d(t+ 1))
⊤, σ(t+ 1)) with the density:
pi(x
i
1, . . . , x
i
d;µ
i(t+ 1), σ(t+ 1))
=
1
(
√
2πσ(t+ 1))d
exp
{
−
d∑
k=1
(xik − µik(t+ 1))2
2σ2(t+ 1)
}
.
The initial value of the means µi(0), i ∈ {N}, can be set to
any finite value. The successive means are updated as follows:
µi(t+ 1) = ProjAi
[
µi(t)
− γ(t)σ2(t)
(
Jˆi(t)
xi(t)− µi(t)
σ2(t)
+ ǫ(t)µi(t)
) ]
. (2)
In the above, ProjC [·] denotes the projection operator on set C,
γ(t) is a step-size parameter and ǫ(t) > 0 is a regularization
parameter. We highlight the difference between the proposed
approach and that of [15] due to the additional term ǫ(t)
in (2). In the absence of this term the algorithm would not
be convergent under a mere monotonicity assumption on the
game mapping (see counterexample provided in [4]).
Let us provide insight into the algorithm by deriving an
analogy to a regularized stochastic gradient algorithm. Given
σ > 0, for any i ∈ [N ] define J˜i : RNd → R as
J˜i(µ
1, . . . ,µN , σ) =
∫
RNd
Ji(x)p(µ,x, σ)dx, (3)
where p(µ,x, σ) =
∏N
i=1 pi(x
i
1, . . . , x
i
d;µ
i, σ). Above, J˜i,
i ∈ [N ], can be interpreted as the ith player’s cost function
in mixed strategies. We can now show that the second term
inside the projection in (2) is a sample of the gradient of
this cost function J˜i with respect to the mixed strategies. Let
µ(t) = (µ1(t), . . . ,µN (t)).
Lemma 1: Under Assumptions 1 and 5, ∀i ∈ [N ], k ∈ [d]
∂J˜i(µ(t), σ(t))
∂µik
= E
x(t){Jˆi(t)
xik(t)− µik(t)
σ2(t)
}
=E{Ji(x1(t), . . . ,xN (t))x
i
k(t)− µik(t)
σ2(t)
|
xik(t) ∼ N(µik(t), σ(t)), i ∈ [N ], k ∈ [d]}. (4)
Proof:We verify that the differentiation under the integral
sign in (3) is justified. It can then readily be verified that
(4) holds, by taking the differentiation inside the integral. A
3sufficient condition for differentiation under the integral is
that the integral of the formally differentiated function with
respect to µik converges uniformly, whereas the differentiated
function is continuous (see [17], Chapter 17). By formally
differentiating the function under the integral sign and omitting
the arguments t, we obtain
1
σ2
∫
RNd
Ji(x)(x
i
k − µik)p(µ,x, σ)dx. (5)
Given Assumption 1, Ji(x)(x
i
k−µik)p(µ,x, σ) is continuous.
Thus, it remains to check that the integral of this function
converges uniformly with respect to any µ ∈ RNd. To this end,
we can write the Taylor expansion of the function Ji around
the point µ(i, k) ∈ RNd with the coordinates µ(i, k)ik = µik
and µ(i, k)jm = x
j
m for any j 6= i, m 6= k, in the integral (5):∫
RNd
Ji(x)(x
i
k − µik)p(µ,x, σ)dx
=
∫
RNd
[Ji(µ(i, k))
+
∂Ji(η(x,µ))
∂xik
(xik − µik)](xik − µik)p(µ,x, σ)dx
=
∫
RNd
∂Ji(η(x,µ))
∂xik
(xik − µik)2p(µ,x, σ)dx
=
∫
RNd
∂Ji(η1(y,µ))
∂xik
(yik)
2p(0,y, σ)dy,
where η(x,µ) = µ(i, k) + θ(x − µ(i, k)), θ ∈ (0, 1),
y = x − µ(i, k), η1(y,µ) = µ(i, k) + θy. The uniform
convergence of the integral above follows from the fact1 that,
under Assumption 5,
∂Ji(η1(y,µ))
∂xi
k
≤ lik for some positive
constant lik and for all i ∈ [N ] and k ∈ [d]. Hence,
|∂Ji(η1(y,µ))
∂xik
(yik)
2p(0,y, σ)| ≤ h(y) = l(yik)2p(0,y, σ),
where
∫
RNd
h(y)dy <∞.
Lemma (1) shows that the second term inside the projection
in (2) is a sample of the gradient of the cost function in
mixed strategies. Hence, algorithm (2) can be interpreted
as a regularized stochastic projection algorithms. To bound
the bias and variance terms of the stochastic projection and
consequently establish convergence of the iterates µ(t), the
parameters γ(t), σ(t), ǫ(t) need to satisfy certain assumptions.
Assumption 6: Let β(t) = γ(t)σ2(t) and choose γ(t) = 1
ta
,
σ(t) = 1
tb
and ǫ(t) = 1
tc
, a, b, c > 0 respectively, such that
a)
∑∞
t=0 β(t) =∞, limt→∞ ǫ(t) = 0,
b)
∑∞
t=0
(
1 + 1
β(t)ǫ(t)
)
|ǫ(t−1)−ǫ(t)|2
ǫ2(t) <∞,
c)
∑∞
t=0 γ
2(t) <∞, ∑∞t=0 β(t)σ(t) <∞,
d) limt→∞ σ(t) = 0,
∑∞
t=0 β(t)ǫ(t) =∞.
Theorem 2: Let the players in game Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji})
choose the states {xi(t)} at time t according to the normal
distribution N(µi(t), σ(t)), where the mean µi(0) is arbitrary
and µi(t) is updated as in (2). Under Assumptions 1-6, as
t → ∞, the mean vector µ(t) converges almost surely to a
Nash equilibrium µ∗ = a∗ of the game Γ and the joint state
x(t) converges in probability to a∗.
1see the basic sufficient condition using majorant [17], Chapter 17.2.3.
Remark 1: As an example for existence of parameters to
satisfy Assumption 6, let a = 59 , b =
5
27 , c =
1
27 .
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ALGORITHM
To prove Theorem 2 we first prove boundedness of the
iterates µ(t). Due to the regularization term ǫ(t), this is done
by analyzing distance of µ(t) from the so-called Tikhonov
trajectory. Having established this boundedness, we can read-
ily show that the limit of the iterates µ(t) exists and sat-
isfies the conditions of a Nash equilibrium of the game
Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}). For the boundedness and the convergence
proofs, we use established results on boundedness ([8], The-
orem 2.5.2) and convergence of a sequence of stochastic
processes (Lemma 10 (page 49) in [10]), respectively. For ease
of reference, we provide the statement of ([8], Theorem 2.5.2)
and (Lemma 10 (page 49) in [10] ) in the appendix.
A. Boundedness of the Algorithm Iterates
We first show that algorithm (2) falls under the framework
of well-studied Robbins-Monro stochastic approximations pro-
cedures [1] with an additional regularization ǫ(t). Next, lever-
aging this analogy and results on stability of discrete-time
Markov processes ([8], Theorem 2.5.2) applied to the sequence
µ(t) we prove boundedness of the iterates.
Using the notationM i(·) = (Mi,1(·), . . . ,Mi,d(·)), we can
rewrite the algorithm step in (2) in the following form:
µi(t+ 1) = ProjAi [µ
i(t)− γ(t)σ2(t)
× (M i(µ(t)) +Qi(µ(t), σ(t)) +Ri(µ(t),x(t), σ(t))
+ ǫ(t))µi(t)
)
, (6)
for all i ∈ [N ]
Qi(µ(t), σ(t)) = M˜ i(µ(t), σ(t)) −M i(µ(t)),
Ri(x(t),µ(t), σ(t)) = F i(x(t),µ(t), σ(t)) − M˜ i(µ(t), σ(t)),
F i(x(t),µ(t), σ(t)) = Jˆi(t)
xi(t)− µi(t)
σ2(t)
,
and M˜ i(·) = (M˜i,1(·), . . . , M˜i,d(·))⊤ is the d-dimensional
mapping with the following elements:
M˜i,k(µ(t), σ(t)) =
∂J˜i(µ(t), σ(t))
∂µik
, for k ∈ [d]. (7)
The vector M (µ(t)) = (M1(µ(t)), . . . ,MN (µ(t))) cor-
responds to the gradient term in stochastic approximation
procedures, whereas
Q(µ(t), σ(t)) = (Q1(µ(t), σ(t)), . . . ,QN (µ(t), σ(t)))
is a disturbance of the gradient term. Finally,
R(x(t),µ(t), σ(t)) = (R1(x(t),µ(t), σ(t)), . . . ,
RN (x(t),µ(t), σ(t)))
is a martingale difference, namely, according to (4),
Ri(x(t),µ(t), σ(t)) = F i(x(t),µ(t), σ(t)) (8)
− E
x(t){F i(x(t),µ(t), σ(t))}, i ∈ [N ].
4To ensure boundedness of µ(t) (Lemma 3) we bound the
martingale term above (see Inequality (23)). To bound the
disturbance of the gradientsQ(µ(t), σ(t)) (see Equation (20)),
we observe that the mapping M˜ i(µ(t)) evaluated at µ(t) is
equivalent to the game mapping in mixed strategies (please
see Appendix for the proof of this observation). That is,
M˜ i(µ(t)) =
∫
RNd
M i(x)p(µ(t),x)dx. (9)
In contrast to stochastic approximation algorithms and the
proof in [15], we have an addition term ǫ(t)µ(t) to be able
to address merely monotone game mappings. As such, to
bound µ(t) we also relate the variations of the sequence
µ(t) to those of the Tikhonov sequence defined below. Let
y(t) = (y1(t), . . . ,yN (t)) denote the solution of the varia-
tional inequality V I(A,M(y) + ǫ(t)y), namely
y(t) ∈ SOL(A,M(y) + ǫ(t)y). (10)
The sequence {y(t)} is known as the Tikhonov sequence and
enjoys the following two important properties.
Theorem 3: (Theorem 12.2.3 in [9]) Under Assumptions 2,
3, and 4, y(t) defined in (10) exists and is unique for each
t. Moreover, for ǫ(t) ↓ 0, y(t) is uniformly bounded and
converges to the least norm solution of V I(A,M).
Lemma 2: (Lemma 3 in [6]) Under Assumption 2
‖y(t)− y(t− 1)‖ ≤My |ǫ(t− 1)− ǫ(t)|
ǫ(t)
, ∀t ≥ 1,
where My is a uniform bound on the norm of the Tikhonov
sequence, i.e. ‖y(t)‖ ≤My for all t ≥ 0.
With the results above in place, we connect the squared
distance ‖µ−y(t)‖2 to the squared distance ‖µ−y(t− 1)‖2
for any µ ∈ A and t ≥ 1. Due to the triangle inequality,
‖µ− y(t)‖ ≤ ‖µ− y(t− 1)‖+ ‖y(t− 1)− y(t)‖ (11)
≤ ‖µ− y(t− 1)‖+My |ǫ(t− 1)− ǫ(t)|
ǫ(t)
,
where in the last inequality we used Lemma 2. Hence, by
taking into account that for any a, b ∈ R and θ > 0
2ab ≤ θa2 + b
2
θ
,
we conclude from (11) that for any θ > 0
‖µ− y(t)‖2 ≤(1 + θ)‖µ− y(t− 1)‖2
+
(
1 +
1
θ
)
M2y
|ǫ(t− 1)− ǫ(t)|2
ǫ2(t)
. (12)
The above bound serves as the main new inequality in order
to show almost-sure boundedness of ‖µ(t)‖ in comparison to
non-regularized stochastic gradient procedures.
Lemma 3: Let Assumptions 2-6 hold in Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji})
and µ(t) be the vector updated in the run of the payoff-based
algorithm (6). Then, Pr{supt≥0 ‖µ(t)‖ <∞} = 1.
In the following, for simplicity in notation, we omit the ar-
gument σ(t) in the terms M˜ ,Q, andR. In certain derivations,
for the same reason we omit the time parameter t as well.
Proof: Define V (t,µ) = ‖µ − y(t − 1)‖2, where y(t)
is the Tikhonov sequence defined by (10). We consider the
generating operator of the Markov process µ(t)
LV (t,µ) = E[V (t+ 1,µ(t+ 1)) | µ(t) = µ]− V (t,µ),
and aim to show that LV (t,µ) satisfies the following decay
LV (t,µ) ≤ −α(t+ 1)ψ(µ) + φ(t)(1 + V (t,µ)), (13)
where ψ ≥ 0 on RNd, φ(t) > 0, ∀t, ∑∞t=0 φ(t) <∞, α(t) >
0,
∑∞
t=0 α(t) = ∞. This enables us to apply Theorem 2.5.2
in [8] to directly conclude almost sure boundedness of µ(t).
Let us bound the growth of V (t + 1,µ) in terms of
V (t,µ). Let θ = β(t)ǫ(t) in (12). From Assumption 6 b),(
1 + 1
β(t)ǫ(t)
)
|ǫ(t−1)−ǫ(t)|2
ǫ2(t) → 0 as t→∞. Hence, ∀µ ∈ A
V (t+ 1,µ) =‖µ− y(t)‖2 (14)
≤(1 + β(t)ǫ(t))‖µ − y(t− 1)‖2
+
(
1 +
1
β(t)ǫ(t)
)
M2y
|ǫ(t− 1)− ǫ(t)|2
ǫ2(t)
=O(1 + ‖µ− y(t− 1)‖2) = O(1 + V (t,µ)).
From the procedure for the update of µ(t), the non-
expansion property of the projection operator, the fact that y(t)
belongs to SOL(A,M(y) + ǫ(t)y), namely, that ∀i ∈ [N ]
yi(t) = ProjAi [y
i(t)− β(t)(M i(y(t)) + ǫ(t)yi(t)],
we obtain that for any i ∈ [N ]
‖µi(t+ 1)− yi(t)‖2
≤ ‖µi(t)− yi(t)− β(t)[ǫ(t)(µi(t)− yi(t))
+ (M i(µ(t))−M i(y(t)) +Qi(µ(t)) +Ri(x(t),µ(t))
]‖2
= ‖µi(t)− yi(t)‖2
− 2β(t)(M i(µ(t))−M i(y(t)),µi(t)− yi(t))
− 2β(t)ǫ(t)(µi(t)− yi(t),µi(t)− yi(t))
− 2β(t)(Qi(µ(t)) +Ri(x(t),µ(t)),µi(t)− yi(t))
+ β2(t)‖Gi(x(t),µ(t))‖2, (15)
where, for ease of notation, we have defined
Gi(x(t),µ(t)) =ǫ(t)(µ
i(t)− yi(t))
+M i(µ(t))−M i(y(t))
+Qi(µ(t)) +Ri(x(t),µ(t)). (16)
Our goal is to bound E{‖µi(t+1)−yi(t)‖2|µ(t) = µ} above,
and use this bound in constructing Inequality (13). As such,
we expandGi as below and bound the terms in the expansion.
‖Gi(x(t),µ(t))‖2 = ǫ2(t)‖µi(t)− yi(t)‖2
+ ‖M i(µ(t))−M i(y(t))‖2
+ ‖Qi(µ(t))‖2 + ‖Ri(x(t),µ(t))‖2
+ 2(Qi(µ(t)),Ri(x(t),µ(t)))
+ 2ǫ(t)(M i(µ(t))−M i(y(t)),µi(t)− yi(t))
+ 2(ǫ(t)(µi(t)− yi(t)) +M i(µ(t)) −M i(y(t)),
Qi(µ(t)) +Ri(x(t),µ(t))), (17)
5Due to Assumption 4, we conclude that
‖M i(µ)−M i(y(t))‖2 ≤ L2i ‖µ− y(t)‖2 = O(V (t+ 1,µ))
≤ O(1 + V (t,µ)), (18)
(M i(µ)−M i(y(t)),µi − yi(t))
≤ ‖M i(µ)−M i(y(t))‖‖µi − yi(t)‖
≤ O(1 + V (t+ 1,µ)) ≤ O(1 + V (t,µ)), (19)
where in the last inequalities in (18)-(19) we used (14). Let
us analyze the terms containing the disturbance of gradient,
namely Qi, in Equation (17). Since Qi(µ(t)) = M˜ i(µ(t))−
M i(µ(t)), due to Assumption 2 and Equation (9), we obtain
‖Qi(µ)‖ = ‖
∫
RNd
[M i(x)−M i(µ)]p(µ,x)dx‖
≤
∫
RNd
‖M i(x)−M i(µ)‖p(µ,x)dx
≤
∫
RNd
Li‖x− µ‖p(µ,x)dx
≤
∫
RNd
Li
(
N∑
i=1
d∑
k=1
|xik − µik|
)
p(µ,x)dx
= O(
N∑
i=1
σ), (20)
where the last equality is due to the fact that the first
central absolute moment of a random variable with a normal
distribution N(µ, σ) is O(σ). The estimation above and (14)
imply, in particular, that for any µ ∈ A
‖Qi(µ)‖‖µi − yi(t)‖ ≤ O(
N∑
i=1
σ)(1 + V (t,µ)) (21)
‖Qi(µ)‖‖Mi(µ)−Mi(y(t))‖ ≤ Li‖Qi(µ)‖‖µ− y(t)‖
≤ O(
N∑
i=1
σ)(1 + V (t,µ)). (22)
Finally, we bound the martingale term ‖Ri(x(t),µ(t))‖2.
E{‖Ri(x(t),µ(t))‖2|µ(t) = µ}
≤
d∑
k=1
∫
RNd
Ji
2(x)
(xik − µik(t))2
σ4(t)
p(µ,x)dx
≤ fi(µ, σ(t))
σ4(t)
≤ O(1 + V (t,µ))
σ4(t)
, (23)
where the first inequality is due to the fact that E(ξ−Eξ)2 ≤
Eξ2 and taking into account (8), the second inequality is due
to Assumption 5, with fi(µ, σ(t)) being a quadratic function
of µ and σ(t), i ∈ [N ]. Bringing the inequalities (18)-(23)
in the inequality (15), taking into account (14), the Cauchi-
Schwarz inequality, and the martingale properties in (8) ofRi,
i ∈ [N ], we get
E{‖µi(t+ 1)− yi(t)‖2|µ(t) = µ}
≤ (1− 2β(t)ǫ(t))‖µi − yi(t)‖2
− 2β(t)(M i(µ)−M i(y(t)),µi − yi(t))
− 2β(t)(Qi(µ),µi − yi(t))
+ β2(t)E{‖Gi(x(t),µ)‖2|µ(t) = µ}
≤ (1− 2β(t)ǫ(t))‖µi − yi(t)‖2
− 2β(t)(M i(µ)−M i(y(t)),µi − yi(t))
+ 2β(t)O(
N∑
i=1
σ(t))(1 + V (t,µ))
+O(γ2(t))(1 + V (t,µ)), (24)
where in the last inequality we used the fact that ǫ(t) → 0
(Assumption 6 a)), γ(t) → 0, and σ(t) → 0 for all i ∈ [N ]
as t → ∞ (Assumption 6 c), d)). Thus, taking into account
Assumption 6 c), d) and (24), we obtain
E[‖µ(t+ 1)− y(t)‖2|µ(t) = µ]
=
N∑
i=1
E[‖µi(t+ 1)− yi(t)‖2|µ(t) = µ]
≤(1− 2ǫ(t)β(t))‖µ− y(t)‖2
− 2β(t)(M (µ)−M(y(t)),µ− y(t))
+O(β(t)σ(t) + γ2(t))(1 + V (t,µ)). (25)
Using the first inequality in (14), we get
LV (t,µ)
= E[‖µ(t+ 1)− y(t)‖2|µ(t) = µ]− ‖µ− y(t− 1)‖2
≤ E[‖µ(t+ 1)− y(t)‖2|µ(t) = µ]
−
‖µ− y(t)‖2 −M2y
(
1 + 1
β(t)ǫ(t)
)
|ǫ(t−1)−ǫ(t)|2
ǫ2(t)
1 + β(t)ǫ(t)
. (26)
We conclude from (26) and (25) that
LV (t,µ) ≤
(
1− 2ǫ(t)β(t)− 1
1 + ǫ(t)β(t)
)
‖µ− y(t)‖2
− 2β(t)(M (µ)−M(y(t)),µ− y(t))
+ h(t)(1 + V (t,µ))
≤ −2β(t)(M (µ)−M(y(t)),µ− y(t))
+ h(t)(1 + V (t,µ)), (27)
where
h(t) =O(β(t)σ(t) + γ2(t))
+O
((
1 +
1
β(t)ǫ(t)
) |ǫ(t− 1)− ǫ(t)|2
ǫ2(t)
)
, (28)
and the second inequality above is due to the fact that
(1− 2ǫ(t)β(t))(1 + ǫ(t)β(t)) ≤ 1.
According to Assumption 6 b)-c),
∑∞
t=0 h(t) < ∞. Further-
more, from Assumption 6 a)
∑∞
t=0 β(t) = ∞. Taking into
account this, (27), and monotonicity of M implying
(M (µ)−M (y(t)),µ− y(t)) ≥ 0, ∀t, ∀µ ∈ A, (29)
we conclude that LV (t,µ) satisfies the decay needed for the
application of Theorem 2.5.2 in [8] and consequently, µ(t) is
finite almost surely for any t ∈ Z+ irrespective of µ(0).
6B. Convergence of the Algorithm
Fortunately, the derivations in the previous section in prov-
ing boundedness of the iterates can be used to also prove
convergence of the algorithm. In particular, we use Inequality
(25), which bounds the decay of the sequence E[‖µ(t+ 1)−
y(t)‖2|µ(t)] in terms of ‖µ− y(t)‖2. We can show that this
decay satisfies the conditions for applying Lemma 10 in [10].
From this, it can readily be inferred that random variables
‖µ(t)−y(t−1)‖ converge to zero. In essence, the approach is
similar to showing that V (t, µ) serves as a stochastic Lyapunov
function for the sequence of random variables.
Proof: (of Theorem 2) First, rewrite (25) as follows:
E[‖µ(t+ 1)− y(t)‖2|Ft]
≤(1− 2ǫ(t)β(t))‖µ(t)− y(t)‖2
+O(γ2(t) + β(t)σ(t))(1 + V (t,µ(t)))
≤(1− 2ǫ(t)β(t))‖µ(t)− y(t)‖2 +O(γ2(t) + β(t)σ(t))
≤(1− 2ǫ(t)β(t))(1 + ǫ(t)β(t))‖µ(t)− y(t− 1)‖2 +O(h(t))
≤(1− ǫ(t)β(t))‖µ(t)− y(t− 1)‖2 +O(h(t)), (30)
where Ft is the σ-algebra generated by the random variables
{x(k),µ(k)}tk=0 and h(t) is defined in (28). In (30) to get
the first inequality we used (29), to get the second inequality
we used Lemma 3, namely the fact that µ(t) is almost surely
bounded for all t ∈ Z+, to get the third inequality we used
(14), and to get the last inequality we used the fact that (1−
2ǫ(t)β(t))(1 + ǫ(t)β(t)) < (1 − ǫ(t)β(t)).
From Assumption 6, and the choices of γ(t), σ(t), ǫ(t), we
get O(h(t)) = 1
tl
, ǫ(t)β(t) = 1
tm
, with l > 1, m ≤ 1. Thus,
lim
t→∞
O(h(t))
ǫ(t)β(t)
= 0.
Assumption 6 d), the fact that
∑∞
t=0 h(t) <∞ and the above
result in the decay (30) imply that we can apply Lemma 10
in [10] to the sequence ‖µ(t + 1) − y(t)‖2 to conclude its
almost sure convergence to 0 as t→∞. Next, by taking into
account Theorem 3 and Theorem 1, we obtain that
Pr{ lim
t→∞
µ(t) = a∗} = 1,
where a∗ is the least norm Nash equilibrium in the
game Γ(N, {Ai}, {Ji}). Finally, Assumption 6 implies that
limt→∞ σ(t) = 0. Taking into account that x(t) ∼
N(µ(t), σ(t)), we conclude that x(t) converges weakly to a
Nash equilibrium a∗ = µ∗. Moreover, according to Portman-
teau Lemma [5], this convergence is also in probability.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
As noted in the introduction, the work [4] provides a
counterexample showing that the class of gradient-based pro-
cedures proposed in [16] and [15] fail to converge to a Nash
equilibrium, if the game mapping is merely monotone. In this
section, we demonstrate that the inclusion of the Tikhonov
regularization term in algorithm [15] rectifies this issue. In
particular, the payoff-based algorithm proposed here converges
to the Nash equilibrium in the game under consideration.
Following the discussion in [4], we consider the game with
2 players, whose action sets are 1-dimensional sets A1 =
A2 = [−1, 1] and the cost functions are J1(a1, a2) = a1a2
and J2(a1, a2) = −a1a2 respectively. It can be verified that
the game mapping M(a1, a2) = (a2,−a1) is monotone and
the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is a∗ = (0, 0). By
implementing the payoff-based algorithm (6) with randomly
chosen initial values µ1(0) and µ2(0) and the parameters γ(t),
σ(t), and ǫ(t) set up according to Remark 1, we obtain the
updates for the mean values µ1(t) and µ2(t) of the players,
presented in Figure 1. As we can see, the procedure ensures the
means arrive at a sufficiently small neighborhood of the Nash
equilibrium after approximately 900 iterations and continue
approaching it in its further run.
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Fig. 1. The mean values for µ1 and µ2 based on Procedure (2).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a payoff-based algorithm for learning Nash
equilibria in convex games with monotone game mappings.
Our algorithm relied on a suitable regularization to handle
monotonicity. The convergence proof relied on the analysis
of the Tikhonov sequence related to the regularization and
well-established results on boundedness and convergence of
stochastic processes. Our current work addresses establishing
convergence rate of the algorithm under suitable assumptions.
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APPENDIX
A. Supporting Theorems
Let {X(t)}t, t ∈ Z+, be a discrete-time Markov process on
some state space E ⊆ Rd, namely X(t) = X(t, ω) : Z+ ×
Ω→ E, where Ω is the sample space of the probability space
on which the process X(t) is defined. The transition function
of this chain, namely Pr{X(t+1) ∈ Γ|X(t) = X}, is denoted
by P (t,X, t+ 1,Γ), Γ ⊆ E.
Definition 4: The operator L defined on the set of measur-
able functions V : Z+ × E → R, X ∈ E, by
LV (t,X) =
∫
P (t,X, t+ 1, dy)[V (t+ 1, y)− V (t,X)]
= E[V (t+ 1,X(t+ 1)) | X(t) = X]− V (t,X),
is called a generating operator of a Markov process {X(t)}t.
Next, we formulate the following theorem for discrete-time
Markov processes, which is proven in [8], Theorem 2.5.2.
Theorem 4: Consider a Markov process {X(t)}t and sup-
pose that there exists a function V (t,X) ≥ 0 such that
inft≥0 V (t,X)→∞ as ‖X‖ → ∞ and
LV (t,X) ≤ −α(t+ 1)ψ(t,X) + f(t)(1 + V (t,X)),
where ψ ≥ 0 on R×Rd, f(t) > 0,∑∞t=0 f(t) <∞. Let α(t)
be such that α(t) > 0,
∑∞
t=0 α(t) = ∞. Then, almost surely
supt≥0 ‖X(t, ω)‖ = R(ω) <∞.
The following result related to the convergence of the
stochastic process is proven in Lemma 10 (page 49) in [10].
Theorem 5: Let v0, . . . , vk be a sequence of random vari-
ables, vk ≥ 0, Ev0 <∞ and let
E{vk+1|Fk} ≤ (1− αk)vk + βk,
where Fk is the σ-algebra generated by the random variables
{v0, . . . , vk}, 0 < αk < 1,
∑∞
k=0 αk = ∞, βk ≥ 0,∑∞
k=0 βk <∞, limk→∞ βkαk = 0. Then vk → 0 almost surely,
Evk → 0 as k →∞.
B. Verification of Equation (9)
We will show that the mapping M˜ i(µ(t), σ(t)) (see (7))
evaluated at µ(t) is equivalent to the extended game mapping:
M˜ i(µ(t)) =
∫
RNd
M i(x)p(µ(t),x)dx.
Note that for simplicity in notation, we drop the dependence
on σ(t) and on t. Now, using the notations
µi−k = (µ
i
1, . . . , µ
i
k−1, µ
i
k−1, . . . µ
i
d) ∈ Rd−1,
xi−k = (x
i
1, . . . , x
i
k−1, x
i
k−1, . . . x
i
d) ∈ Rd−1,
p(µi−k, x
i
−k) =
1
(
√
2πσi)d−1
exp

−
∑
j 6=k
(xij − µij)2
2σ2i


p(µ−i,x−i) =
N∏
j 6=i,j=1
1
(
√
2πσj)d
exp
{
−
d∑
k=1
(xjk − µjk)2
2σ2j
}
,
we have that for any i ∈ [N ], k ∈ [d], M˜i,k(η)
M˜i,k(µ) =
∂J˜i(µ(t), σ(t))
∂µik
=
1
σ2i
∫
RNd
Ji(x)(x
i
k − µik)p(µ,x)dx
= −
∫
RNd
Ji(x)p(µ
i
−k, x
i
−k)p(µ
−i,x−i)
1√
2πσi
× d
(
e
−
(xi
k
−µi
k
)2
2σ2
i
)
dx−i
= −
∫
RNd−1
(
Ji(x)e
−
(xi
k
−µi
k
)2
2σ2
i
) ∣∣∣∣
∞(xik)
−∞(xi
k
)
× p(µi−k, xi−k)p(µ−i,x−i)
1√
2πσi
dx−i
+
∫
RNd
∂Ji(x)
∂xik
p(µ,x)dx
8=
∫
RNd
∂Ji(x)
∂xik
p(µ,x)dx. (31)
In the above, for the second equality, we used Lemma (1)
to enable differentiation under the integral and for the last
equality, we used the fact that according to Assumption 5,
lim
xi
k
→∞(−∞)
Ji(x)e
−
(xi
k
−µi
k
)2
2σ2
i = 0,
for any fixed µik, x
−i. Now, by definition ofM i(x), we have
that∫
RNd
∂Ji(x)
∂xik
p(µ,x)dx =
∫
RNd
M i(x)p(µ(t),x)dx,
as desired.
